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PRESUMING INNOCENCE: ALAN P AKULA AND 
SCOTT TuRow TAKE ON THE GREAT AMERICAN 
LEGAL FICTION 
CHRISTINE ALICE CoRcos*t 
The film Presumed Innocent is the subject of this 
Article by Professor Corcos. She explores the film's 
model,s of relationship between law and justice and be­
tween the attorney and layperson. In the film, the pre­
sumption of innocence formally releases a truly inno­
cent person from legal proceedings, but is unable to 
release him from informal suspicion by laypersons 
who seek substantive justice. Using this theme, Profes­
sor Corcos assesses the irony and tension present in 
the film. 
FORMER PROSECUTOR SET FREE 
CHARGES AGAINST RUSTY SABICH DISMISSED 
Spectators were stunned today when Judge Leon Lyttle 
dismissed murder charges against former D.A. Rosatt K 
(Rusty) Sabi ch on the grounds that the prosecution had 
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center. B.A., M.A. 
(Michigan State University), A.M.L.S. (University of Michigan), J.D. (Case Western 
Reserve Law School). 
t This essay is part of a larger work in progress, Legal, Fi.cti<Yns: Irony, Story­
t,eJJ,ing, Truth and Justice in the Twentieth Century Courtroom Drama. Carol Clo­
ver, University of California, Berkeley, and Laura Tartakoff, Case Western Reserve 
University, and Annemarie Corcos kindly read this essay in draft. CWRU Law 
School Professor and Associate White House Counsel William P. Marshall made 
many insightful and critical objections about which he was as correct as he is 
about Empl.oyment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Sandra Garlock (CWRU '95), 
Alison Colwell (CWRU Law School '96) and Jill Kuswa (LSU Law '98) provided 
helpful research assistance. Charlotte Melius, Head of Public Services at the LSU 
Law Center Library, obtained copies of needed materials with her usual efficiency 
and good humor. 
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mishandled vital evidence needed for a conviction. 
Sabich was charged in the beating death of assistant 
district attorney Carolyn Polhemus. Prosecutor Thomas 
(Tommy) Molto refused to comment on the reasons for 
the missing evidence, saying only that "someone" had 
clearly made a grievous error in handling it, and that an 
investigation was underway. When asked if they pl3lUled 
to bring charges against anyone else in the case, Molto 
said it was "unlikely." Neither Sabich nor his attorney, 
Alexander (Sandy) Stern, could be reached for com-
ment. 
The Kindle County Register, Metro Section, at 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
Kindle County1 newspaper readers whose only source of 
information about Peopw v. Sabich is the article above might 
come to one of two conclusions about the case portrayed in 
Presumed Innocent. 2 For them, the meager facts available out­
side the courtroom must suffice to create a story about Rusty's 
guilt or innocence in accord with their preexisting assumptions 
about the nature of the legal system. Either the accused, an 
assistant prosecutor named Rusty· Sabich, is guilty, an d  appar­
ently has profited somehow from his knowledge of the legal 
system and what may have been honest error, or, he is inno­
cent, and has escaped only through prosecutorial incompetence 
from a nightmare that could be visited on any unsuspecting 
person. 
Observers attending the trial are not much better off. The 
official reason for dismissal of the murder charge is difficult for 
non-lawyers t;o grasp since it seems to be a "legal technicality" 
that allows Rusty to "get away with murder." The witnesses 
against him, including his former supervisor, Raymond Horgan, 
seem well-prepared and quite believable. The police have accu­
mulated substantial circumstantial evidence showing Rusty's 
presence in the victim's apartment. Rusty has inside knowledge 
1. Kindle County is the fictional setting for several of Scott Turow's novels. 
2. (Mirage Productions 1990). Directed by Alan Pakula from the novel by Scott 
Turow (1987). 
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of th� l�g� system and
. 
contro�ed the initial investigation into 
the VIctun s death, dunng which he may have withheld evi­
dence. He seems to have been the logical suspect and the 
probable murderer. 
How then does it happen that Rusty "gets off'? Is his story 
one of a murderer's good fortune and knowledge of "the sys­
tem," or one of an innocent victim eventually vindicated by that 
system? Is it solely through the skill of his attorney that his 
case never goes t;o the jury, or did those procedural safeguards 
that protect both the guilty and innocent bring him safely out of 
the maze? Can either of these stories really explain Rusty's 
descent into the legal labyrinth, or does Presumed Innocent tell 
a third story about truth and falsity, and innocence and guilt? 
Does it illustrate the continuing tension between two images of 
the goal of law: one the impression that non-lawyers have, that 
the goal of law is to achieve justice, and the other the opinion 
that lawyers have, that the goal of law is to preserve the pro­
cesses of fairness? The first image implies that the law is a 
monolith and justice its desired result The second h olds that it 
is a process, whose success is measured by its ability t;o pre­
serve the rights of the individual against the tyranny of govern­
ment or society. The certainty of the just result is self-defining, 
and derives from satisfactory completion of the process. 
I suggest that Presumed Innocent presents us with both 
models of the relationship between law and justice and rejects 
them because of its identification of a fatal flaw in both. Using 
one of the fundamental fictions upon which our legal system is 
based, the film reveals that neither model deals successfully 
with the very real possibility that it can end with failure. The 
layperson, for whom the presumption of innocence is 
counterintuitive, and justice is the desired result, is less likely 
than the lawyer to accept the fiction as workable. The lawyer, 
for whom a just process is the goal, cannot assure the parties 
that that process will result in certainty. The presumption is 
therefore as a practical matter useless both to those who seek 
justice as an end and to those who practice it as a means. 
Through the story of Rusty Sabich, we see the presumption of 
innocence release a genuinely innocent person from formal 
accusation while failing to liberate him from informal suspicion. 
The legal system's inability to address this outcome is its fatal 
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flaw. 
IDENTIFYING AssUMPTIONS AND FORMULATING STORIES 
Characteristic Stories 
These questions are classic ones both for characters in 
courtroom dramas3 and for those of us who observe the action 
in and out of the courtroom. 4 Courtroom drama jurors must 
make a choice among the stories presented to them through 
arcane rules of evidence and based on what limited facts they 
are allowed to consider. Other characters, freer to accept or 
reject the evidence of their senses, gathered both inside and 
out of the courtroom, also create stories about quilt or inno­
cence which validate or contradict prior assumptions held 
about the legal system. As outside obseivers, we too evaluate 
the stories that such dramas tell about the legal system, accept­
ing or rejecting their messages based on our beliefs, our hopes, 
or our cynicism about the possibility of justice. 
Some courtroom dramas, such as Anatomy of a Murdel' 
and To Kill a Mockingbird,6 present us with two stories: one 
that the jury within the film has accepted as truth, and the 
other one that the fihn presents to us through Rusty's eyes, and 
that we accept as truth. Through their onscreen trials, these 
3. On the courtroom drama in general see John Dorsey, The Twentieth Century 
Courtroom Drama (1979) (dissertation, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign). On 
the trial as focus of a narrative see ANN M. ALGEO, THE CoURrROOM AS FORUM: HO­
MICIDE TRIALs BY DREISER, WRIGIIT, CAPOTE, AND MAILER (1996). 
4. Courtroom drama juroIS are even more limited than we the viewers, since 
(as in real life) they should consider onJy the evidence legally presented in making 
their decisions, thus deciding on the most persuasive story. However, some 
filmmakeIS have explored the role of storytelling and/or external evidence in bring­
ing culprits to justice or freeing the innocent A classic example is 12 ANGRY MEN 
(Orion-Nova/United Artists 1957) (Henry Fonda convincing eleven other jurors of 
the truth of his interpretation of the evidence based on their own perceptions of 
the world). More recently, the idea of the "guilty juror" {the killer actually serving 
on the jury) or the "knowledgeable-juror" (the juror solving the crime based on 
knowledge gained outside the courtroom) has come into vogue. See SUSPECT (Co­
lumbia/l'ri-St.ar 1987) Guror attempts to solve crime based on specialized knowl­
edge); A Kw.ER AMONG Us (NBC �levision broadcast, Oct 29, 1990) Guror be­
comes convinced that another member of the jury is the real killer). 
5. (Columbia 1959). 
6. (UniveISal 1962). 
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films give us two resolutions to the question of guilt or inno­
cence: the filmic trial and the offscreen trial. These resolutions 
translate into public and private "truths" about guilt and inno­
cence as well. Often these versions of truth d o  not agree. In 
Anatomy, for example, the jury finds the defendant "innocent" 
although we know he is "guilty"; in Mockingbird the reverse is 
true. Other courtroom dramas, such as Reversal of Fortune7 
and The Paradine Case, 8 resolve the filmic trial in one way 
while leaving us to ponder the "truth"-the defendant in Rever­
sal of Fortune is found "innocent" while we are left uncertain 
as to the film's opinion of his guilt; in The Paradine Case, the 
defendant is found "guilty" while the film strongly suggests that 
she might be "innocent." In all of these dramas, however, the 
trial comes to some public conclusion about guilt or innocence. 
Some story is publicly accepted as "truth." 
Presumed Innocent and Characteristic Stories 
Presumed Innocent is a different case. We obtain no public 
resolution, no "truth," in the filmic trial, because the jury never 
returns a verdict. Rather, along with Rusty, we obtain a private 
resolution-we learn "truth" in a way that leaves permanently 
unresolved the basic questions that the legal system is designed 
to answer. 
Further, we who have knowledge from both inside and 
outside the courtroom can create a story that resolves the pri­
mary question about Rusty's innocence. But that resolution 
forces us to consider more deeply the question of another kind 
of guilt or innocence: the guilt or innocence of the legal system 
in creating or allowing the circwnstances of Rusty's arrest and 
trial. If we had the limited knowledge of the newspaper reader 
or the courtroom obseIVer, this question would be less impor­
tant. If we consider Rusty guilty, we would conclude that his 
story illustrates corruption, whatever our initial beliefs about 
the system. Should we find Rusty innocent (that is, give effect 
to the presumption of innocence) we would also believe his 
story illustrates eventual vindication through the legal system, 
7. (Sovereign Pictures 1990). 
8. (Vanguard/Selznick 1947). 
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whatever our opinion of the balance between corruption and 
fairness in that system. 9 Either the system can be so distorted 
that a corrupt defendant and his unscrupulous advocate ma­
nipulate it, or it is not so corrupt that an innocent defendant 
and his skillful advocate cannot obtain vindication. 
But Rusty is not vindicated: the charges are dismissed. The 
outcome allows those with limited knowledge to preswne him 
either guilty or innocent, because they have no certainty either 
way. While the legal presumption of innocence may accompany 
him all his life, the actual preswnption of guilt is likely to fol­
low him, leaving questions about the true nature of the legal 
system unanswered. For viewers of the film, however, the 
charge that the legal system is unfair remains after the murder 
charge. Thus, Presumed Innocent forces us to confront along 
with Rusty the knowledge that we know the truth and that for 
all practical purposes that knowledge is irrelevant. 
Because we ultimately acquire enough knowledge after the 
trial to learn the truth about Rusty's guilt, we might view Pre­
sumed Innocent simply as the story of a man wrongly accused, 
a not unconunon theme in movies.10 Rusty battles bias and 
9. It is true that observers with limited knowledge who believe in Rusty's inno­
cence will be dissatisfied with the dismissal, since it seems equivalent to the Scot­
tish verdict of "not proven." 
10. The fear of wrongful accusation and/or conviction is one of the most endur­
ing and frightening specters in popular culture and in literature generally. Franz 
Katka's THE TRIAL (William Muir et al. trans., 1960) is an obvious literacy example, 
and many of Alfred Hit.chcock's films are obvious cinematic ones. See, e.g., THE 
WRONG MAN (Warner Brothers 1956); THE THIRTY NINE STEPS (J. Arthur Rankt20th 
Century Fox 1960) NORTH BY NORTHWEST (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1969). For non­
Hitchcockian examples see THEY WON'T BEUEVE ME (RKO Radio Pictures 1947) and 
FuRY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1936), both discussed in Norman Rosenberg, Ho/J:ywood 
on Trials: Courts and Films, 1930-1960, 12 LAW & HisT. REV. 341 (1994). Wrongful 
conviction is explored in CAIL NmmISIDE 777 (Twentieth Century Fox 1948) (James 
Stewart plays a reporter who investigates an old murder case and discovers that 
an innocent man was imprisoned), A CRY IN THE DARK (Cannon International 1988) 
(Meryl Streep as an Australian mother wrongly convicted of the death of her child, 
really killed by wild dogs), and the passionate I WANT TO LIVE! (Figaro/United Art­
ists 1958) (Susan Hayward as a woman wrongly sentenced and executed for mur­
der). THE LEGEND OF LlzzIE BoRDEN (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 1975) and films 
based on the lives of Bruno Richard Hauptmann (convicted and executed for kid­
napping and killing Charles Lindbergh's child) and the Rosenbergs (convicted and 
executed for treason) are more problematic, as are miniseries depicting famous 
trials such as that of Dr. John Hill in MURDER IN TExAs (NBC television broadca&, 
May 3-4, 1981). Further, the production company for PREsuMED INNOCENT (Mirage 
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what seems to be an awkward attempt on the part of the prose­
cutor to frame him. He is ultimately freed by the legal system 
to which he has devoted his life. 
For the characters in the film, however, Presumed 
Inrwcent tells one of three other stories. Two of them are the 
stories non-lawyers find eminently believable. One story is that 
of the trial of a man so wily, manipulative, and knowledgeable 
about the legal system that the system cannot successfully 
bring him to justice. The other is of a man so unlucky that not 
even his specialized talents can protect him from the suffering 
of an inherently flawed process. These observers also act as 
jurors of a system either so well-constructed that even those 
with the most ability to influence it cannot manage to obtain 
the condemnation and ruin of a guilty man or so perverted that 
it could hound an innocent one, bringing him to the brink of 
disaster. For both these stories, the outcome is crucial to the 
validity of the system. Both groups believe firmly in the exis­
tence of "legal technicalities" which often resolve conflict in 
favor of judicial, if not actual, certainty about guilt or inno­
cence. For either group, the trial's outcome is unsatisfactory 
because it creates neither judicial nor actual certainty. The 
third story is the one the lawyers in the film tell themselves 
about the nature of the legal system. For them, process is all; 
thus, "legal technicalities" preserve that process. Such techni­
calities are not evidence of failure but of success. Thus Rusty's 
story ought to validate the process. Yet, for them the outcome 
is unsatisfactory as well. The system whose substance is pro­
cess ought to provide judicial if not actual certainty. Rusty is 
either innocent or guilty; the ideal process would result in ac­
quittal or conviction. 
Two stories, both from literature but based on fact, demon­
strate the differing attitudes of these two groups. For the lay 
person the substance of the legal system, to preserve and mete 
Productions 1990) is Mirage Productions, a significant name for a film company 
whose product presents the view that justice is a mirage. On Bruno Richard 
Hauptmann, see Anthony Scaduto et. al., Inside New York, NEWSDAY, Apr. 12, 1992, 
at 11 (describing Anthony Hopkins's research into a 1976 movie on Hauptmann). 
On the Rosenbergs, see Gary Arnold, Uneven "Dani.el": Fact Fights Fiction in 
Doctorow Adaptation, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1983, at El (describing film version of 
Doctorow novel based on the Rosenberg trial and its aftermath). 
136 Oldahom.a City University Law Review [Vol. 22 
out justice, is often subordinated to the necessity to preserve 
its form. Thus, injustice is often the inevitable outcome of law. 
Consider the following passage from Jonathan Swift's 
Guilliver's Travels, written to satirize real life social and legal 
situations in eighteenth century England: 
... [l]f my neighbour hath a mind to my cow, he hires a 
lawyer to prove that he ought to have my cow from me. 
I must then hire another to defend my right, it being 
against all rules of law that any man should be allowed 
to speak for himself. Now in this case I who am the 
right owner lie under two great disadvantages. First, my 
lawyer, being practised almost from his cradle in de­
fending falsehood, is quite o ut of his element when he 
would be an advocate for justice, which as an office 
unnatural, he always attempts with ill-will. The second 
disadvantage is that my lawyer must proceed with great 
caution, or else he will be reprimanded by the judges, 
and abhorred by his brethren, as one that would lessen 
the practice of the law. And therefore I have but two 
methods to preserve my cow. The first is to gain over 
my adversary's lawyer with a double fee, who will then 
betray his client by insinuating that he hath justice on 
his side. The second way is for my lawyer to make my 
cause appear as uajust as he can, by allowing the cow 
to belong to my adversary: and this, if it be skillfully 
done, will certainly bespeak the favour of the bench. 
Now, your Honour is to know that these judges are 
persons appointed to decide all controversies of proper­
ty, as well as for the trial of criminals, and picked out 
from the most dexterous lawyers, who are grown old or 
lazy, and having been biassed all their lives against truth 
and equity, are under such a fatal necessity of favouring 
fraud, perjwy, and oppression, that I have known sever­
al of them refuse a large bribe from the side where 
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justice lay, rather than ir\jure the faculty, by doing any 
thing unbecoming their nature or their office.11 
137 
Swift continues in this vein, objecting to the use of prece­
dents, which to his mind justify "the most iniquitous opinions," 
rules of evidence, which allow them to "avoid entering into the 
merits of the cause, " and legal language, which promotes a 
confusion between "the very essence of truth and falsehood, of 
right and wrong; so that it will take thirty years to decide" any 
dispute.12 
But the point is clear: the legal system exists to protect 
those in power, those in power conspire to conceal the truth 
(which would lead to justice), and only th e  exposure of their 
scheme by the author of the critique can reveal the truth to 
society. "Legal technicalities" substitute for a more substantive 
explanation of the seeming ability of many criminals to escape 
punishment while their victims suffer. 
For the lawyer on the other hand, the purpose of the legal 
system is to preserve the rights of the individual through the 
appropriate process. While lawyers may differ on the extent to 
which this goal drives their actions, both prosecutors and de­
fense lawyers for example swear to uphold the Constitution, 
which was designed to preserve the rights of the individual 
against the (federal) government, rather tllan the right of the 
government to impose its will upon the governed. Robert Bolt 
expresses this well in A Man For AU Seasons, when he para­
phrases Sir Thomas More's famous statement: "If the parties 
will at my hands call for justice, then, all were it my father 
stood on the one side, and the Devil on the other, his cause 
being good, the Devil should have right. "13 For the lawyer, the 
process must be upheld, regardless of th e  outcome. A judge 
must not be swayed by the desirability of a particular outcome, 
if fairness will not support it. 
Note that More equates justice and "good," disassociating 
personalities from their causes. This disassociation is the tradi-
11. JONATHAN SWIFJ', GUWVER'S TRAVEU! 282-83 (The Modem Library 1931). 
12. Id. at 283-84. 
13. WILLIAM RoPER, LIFE OF Sm THOMAS MORE 21 (Everyman ed 1963). Robert 
Bolt's play, A Man For AU Seasons, leans heavily upon Roper's work 
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tional one that lay people expect. Invariably, however, in court­
room dramas, as in other types of fictional literature devoted to 
the study of the interaction of law and justice, personalities 
become comingled with their positions. Disentangling them 
becomes a challenge both for the lawyers, who as Swift points 
out want to win their cases and for the clients and jurors, who ' 
want to see "their side" prevail, regardless of the justness of the 
cause. What should be a dispassionate weighing of the merits 
of each case seems to become a battle over personality or poli­
tics or preferences. The procedures on which More's processes 
depend seem arbitrary and their enforcement capricious. Thus 
originates the dissatisfaction with the legal system. 
Expect,ations and the Hidden Defendant of Presumed Inrwcent 
Presumed Inrwcent tells Rusty's stories in neither one of 
the ways that we are used to in understanding the legal system. 
First, Rusty is not the only defendant in Presumed Inrwcent. 
The legal system also is charged with unfairness, either to 
Rusty, if he is innocent, or to us, if he is really guilty. The two 
obvious trials in Presumed Inrwcent are Rusty's trial for mur­
der and the legal system's trial for failure to preserve justice, 
either through outcome or through process. For non-lawyers 
the system's failure to convict Rusty if he is guilty is fatal, or to 
arrest, try and convict the real killer is fatal. 
For lawyers participating in the drama, the system fails not 
because it indicts the "wrong person" (indeed they never know 
that) but because it ends in uncertainty. For lawyers watching 
the film, the system fails not only because the charges against 
Rusty are dropped, but because the legal process comes to a 
stop. The "legal impossibility" of trying another person for the 
crime creates an unacceptable and unalterable impasse. 
For different reasons then, both non-lawyers concerned 
with outcome and lawyers concerned with process are dis­
turbed by the abrupt end to Rusty's trial. Both have been 
robbed of the judicial certainty that a verdict provides and of 
the actual certainty that a completed trial seems to offer. 
Regardless of the outcome, observers want to see the drama 
played out; an interruption before the final curtain is emotion­
ally as well as socially unsettling. 
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Equally disturbing is the question of truth and falsity and 
the extent to which we can place our faith in the legal system 
to determine them effectively. Someone must pay for crimes 
committed, as Rusty tells us early in the film. If Rusty is guilty 
and escapes punishment, Carolyn Polhemus's murder remains 
unavenged, and the legal system has failed. If he is innocent, it 
is "a practical impossibility" to try anyone else for the crime. 
Again the victim is W\avenged, and again the system has failed. 
Dismissal is the best the judge can offer, but it is an unsatis­
factory conclusion, since it leaves open the legal question of 
Rusty's guilt. If he is guilty, what justification or story can we 
tell ourselves about that dismissal beyond the obseivation that 
the prosecution simply hasn't accumulated enough evidence to 
prove Rusty's complicity beyond a reasonable doubt? If he is 
innocent, how can we explain his arrest and trial? What kind of 
legal system allows the guilty to go free and the innocent to 
suffer the tragedy of accusation? From our perspective, as from 
Rusty's, dismissal is not enough. 
For us, the observers outside the film who were present 
during the investigation, arrest, trial, exoneration, and ultimate 
discovery of the truth, the film presents even more disturbing 
questions about the nature of that process. Initially we believe 
in Rusty's innocence, then entertain the possibility of his guilt, 
and finally witness (privately) his exoneration. 
Admittedly, our ability to judge Rusty is initially tainted 
because he provides us with all the information about the case. 
We are initially making our decisions about his guilt or inno­
cence based solely on his testimony. We eventually discover, 
however, that his statements can be independently verified. The 
truth comes not through the legal system but from the drama 
that takes place after the legal system lost interest in Rusty. His 
st.ory is validated, hence made believable, through its consisten­
cy with what we learn by the end of the film. Therefore, even 
although his story may be partially fabricated, we cannot deter­
mine his guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." We become both 
Rusty's jurors, sworn to acquit him in these circumstances, and 
defendants in a third, less obvious trial: our own trial for bias 
against anyone unfortW\ate enough to be accused-our own re-
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luct:ance to "presume innocence."14 We are forced to acknowl­
edge Rusty's complete innocence, and our guilt. Until the end, 
we have been suspicious of him. 
We certainly have some cause to be suspicious. Rusty's 
behavior in the post-dismissal scene with Lipranzer seems to us 
more consistent with likely guilt than probable innocence, as he 
tosses the incriminating glass into the river. But this behavior 
would not, in a court of law, overcome the presumption of 
innocence, the burden of "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
PRESUMPTIONS, STRUCTURE, AND TECHNIQUES 
Introduction 
How does Presumed Innocent15 engage us in contempla­
tion of these various trials? How does it manipulate our percep­
tions of the story and the legal system so that we abandon our 
secret suspicion that "he must be guilty or the police wouldn't 
have arrested him," which left rmcorrected would result in 
outrage at the dismissal of the charges and substitute our cer­
tainty that he is innocent coupled with outrage that "others" 
will continue to suspect him? How, from our secret feeling that 
Rusty may be guilty in spite of the presumption of innocence, 
do we change to our certainty that, in spite of the fact that he 
is innocent, "others" will continue to believe him guilty? 
14. Consider for example the overwhelming number of whites who believed that 
0.J. Simpson was guilty of the murders of his ex-wife and her friend even before 
the trial was well underway. See Mona Charen, IlaciaJ. Split Over O.J. 1'ri,aJ, Is Dis­
heart.ening, FREsNO BEE, Mar. 10, 1995, at B7 (citing a Harris poll finding that 6196 
of white Americans believed Simpson is guilty). 
15. The fact that two "authors" (Scott Turow, the novelist, and Alan Pakula, the 
director) contributed to the film, complicates the issue somewhat. For simplicity's 
sake I will refer to "the film" or "Presumed Innocent" as representing the t.otality 
of Pakula's and Turow's vision. The real relationship among the creators of a film 
is much more complex. 
Peter Benchley reads an article in a newspaper about a fisherman who cair 
tores a forty-five-hundred-pound shark off the coast of Long Island . . . [A]nd even­
tually he writes a novel . . . and Zanuck-Brown buy the movie rights, and Benchley 
and Carl Gottlieb write a screenplay, and Bill Butler is hired t.o shoot the movie, 
and Joseph Alves, Jr., designs it, and Verna Fields is brought in to edit, and, may­
be most im;>ortantly of all, Bob Mattey is brought out of retirement to make the 
monster. And John Williams composes perhaps his most memorable score. How in 
the world is Steven Spielberg the "author" of that? 
WILLIAM GoLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE ScREEN TRADE 101 (1984). 
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Through the use of ironic storytelling, the film manipulates our 
perceptions and alters our opinions, not only of Rusty, but of 
the legal system. As Rusty gains awareness of the ironic nature 
of his story, so do we. 
However, in order to understand the message we must first 
identify our presumptions about the legal system, discover a 
method to identify the film's real messages about those pre­
sumptions, and come to some conclusion about the film's ulti­
mate message. As we already know, Presumed Inrwcent pres­
ents two obvious defendants: Rusty, on trial for murder, and 
the legal system, on trial for unfairness. It uses ironic storytell­
ing to manipulate our opinions of the guilt or innocence of 
these defendants. Once we understand our own presumptions 
about guilt or innocence, we understand the underlying premise 
of the film: ours is the final responsibility for justice. 
Presumptions 
In order to understand the film's ironic message, we must 
also acknowledge certain presumptions about the real (as op­
posed to the reel) legal system, primarily that its major purpose 
is to provide a just result, to dispense justice as fairly as pos­
sible. In doing so it resolves disputes about the past, about 
"what happened," and about "the truth." As Rusty Sabich points 
out in the opening moments of the film, unless a jury can hear 
all the evidence and come to a decision, how can we hope for 
approximate justice, as Rusty does? Simply providing certain­
ty-that is, a resolution of the question of guilt or inno­
cence--without a sense that the resolution bears some relation­
ship to "what really happened" is not enough. We must postu­
late that the elaborate mechanisms of legal procedure, those 
"legal technicalities," will result more often than not in the 
freeing of the innocent and sometimes in the conviction of the 
guilty. In essence, we must presume the legal system "innocent" 
of malicious intent. If we do not begin with that assumption, 
we miss much of the film's ironic message, as it forces us to 
question the seemingly arbitrary and byzantine twists of fate 
that Rusty undergoes. More particularly, we must believe that 
Rusty Sabich initially believes it. 16 Only then does the contrast 
16. Of course, if we do not believe that Rusty accepts a link between law and 
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between his life as an officer of the court and his life as an 
accused murderer become ironic. Indeed, we must believe that 
Rusty as a lawyer is committed to the process, even though it 
ultimately fails him. 
Indeed, we have no reason to believe that Rusty does not 
initially accept the ultimate fairness of the system. The film 
gives us many indications that this is so, including his initial 
address to us during the opening credits. Thus the film pre­
pares us to accept its message ·through the contrast between 
Rusty's beliefs, which initially we share, and its own beliefs 
about the legal system, which it will persuade us to accept by 
the end of the story, namely that justice is neither the neces­
sary nor even the probable outcome of the legal system. The 
film introduces us to the question of how we "know" what we 
know about guilt, innocence, truth, and falsity, and whether we 
can truly "know" anything with enough certainty to believe that 
the legal system can ever "do justice. "17 
The Structure and Techniques of Ironic Storytelling 
Like many other courtroom dramas,18 Presumed Innocent 
uses ironic storytelling to convey its message of imperfect jus­
tice. It forces us to examine our presumptions about the legal 
system, and shows us, subtly and inexorably, how flawed they 
are. Through images, events and conversations, both in and out 
of the courtroom, the film puts the legal system on trial. Ironic 
storytelling lends itself to use in c ourtroom dramas like pre­
sumed Innocent partly because of its elegance and subtlety. In 
addition, it helps the film convey its message about the funda­
mental conflict between justice and injustice in the legal system 
justice we indicate that we disbelieve at least some of what he says. In that case, 
what happens to him throughout the film is p erfectly predictable, since we doubt 
his word But the ending makes nonsense of this interpretation. 
17. Compare with the filmic Sunny von Bulow's voiceover remark about her 
husband in REVERSAL OF FORTUNE (Sovereign Pictures 1990): "Is he [Claus] the 
devil? If so, can the devil get justice?" 
18. For a more comprehensive analysis of irony and storytelling in the court· 
room drama, see Corcos, Legal Fictiom, supra note t (discussing the use of irony 
and storytelling in WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (Theme/United Artists 1957), 
ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959), THE PARADINE CASE (Vanguard/Selznick 
1947), JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Roxlom/United Artists 1961), and PRESUMED INNO­
CENT (Mirage Productions 1990), among other films). 
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far more persuasively th an  a straightforward telling of the story 
would do. It lends itself to the "surprise ending" that observers 
find more interesting, allowing them to decipher the meaning of 
the film for themselves, rather than having it simply presented 
to them. 
Just as the jury hears conflicting stories, each interpreting 
the evidence, we hear conflicting stories, explaining the action 
outside the courtroom. Just as lawyers manipulate the rules of 
evidence to control the content of those stories, the film con­
trols the content of the stories we hear and see. 19 In order to 
analyze the complex messages in Presumed Innocent, we must 
first learn to discern the nature and presence of irony in story­
telling. In his work, A Rhetoric of Irony,20 Wayne C. Booth 
gives us valuable insights into the identification of irony in a 
written work. By applying these to the medium of film, we can 
begin to analyze the authors' messages. 
DECIPHERING THE FILM'S IRONIC MESSAGE 
Booth's Five Clues to the Existence of Irony 
Wayne C. Booth's five clues that signal the presence of 
irony in a written work are 1) the "Straightforward warning," 2) 
"Known Error Proclaimed, "21 3) "Conflicts of Facts within the 
Work,"22 4) "Clashes of Style,"23 and 5) "Conflicts of Belief."24 
19. Although both the novel and the film present Rusty's point of view, the 
filmic Rusty is much less obviously the center of attention since other characters 
speak for themselves (albeit through Rusty's retelling). The voice narration, in­
tended to remind us that this is Rusty's version of events, and that Rusty's version 
equals "truth," is much less intrusive than the first person narrative of the novel, 
and therefore much more persuasive. Since we feel less manipulated (both by the 
filmic Rusty and by the auteur), we accept his innocence more readily. 
20. WAYNE C. BoarH, A RHE'l'ORIC OF IRoNY (1974). 
21. Id. at 57. ("If a speaker betrays ignorance or foolishness that is 'simply in­
credible,' the odds are comparatively high that the author, in contrast, lmows what 
he is doing.") The characters in courtroom dramas are rarely ignorant or foolish in 
this way, but they are often clearly wrongheaded or mistaken. 
22. Id. at 61. 
23. "If a speaker's style departs notably from whatever the reader considers the 
normal way of saying a thing, or the way normal for this speaker, the reader may 
suspect irony ... . [A] true stylistic clash must be based on recognizing different 
ways of saying what, in substance, would seem to amount to identical messages." 
Id. at 67-68. John Mortimer uses this approach often in his stories. JOHN C. 
MORTIMER, RUMPOLE OF THE BAILEY (1978). Consider Rumpole's habit of uttering sar-
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Examples of all of these clues are represented in Presumed 
Innocent. Each signals the presence of either dramatic irony 
(also called irony of fate) or irony of character (also called 
irony of impersonation),25 which, as expressed through the 
film, conveys the true message of the film. 
Types of Irony 
What kinds of irony do Booth's clues reveal? Generally, 
both irony of fate and irony of character permeate Presumed 
Innocent. Through persuasive storytelling these convey conflict­
ing messages of fact and belief. 26 
Analyzing the Ironic Messages in Presumed Innocent 
Armed with some ability to identify irony where it exists, 
as well as a definition of the types of irony in use in the film, 
let us examine how the film tells Rusty's story, and how it con­
vinces us of the truth of its message. That message is contained 
in the title of the film, though it will not be completely intelligi­
ble to us until we have meditated on the entire drama. Still, let 
us begin with that phrase, full of double meanings, which en­
capsulates both the authors' and Rusty's beliefs about the legal 
system. 
The title Presumed Innocent is not ironic to the obseIVer 
who recognizes the meaning of the phrase without questioning 
its validity in ordinary courtroom practice. It becomes ironic 
only after the obseIVer finishes watching the film, since its 
message that the presumption of guilt that surrounds Rusty 
Sabich once he is accused is the reality. The "presumption of 
innocence" with which lawyers and judges bombard us is mere 
castic comments under his breath, directed at another character in the st.ory. When 
he is overheard he quickly alt.ers the conunent t.o make a sound-alike but often 
meaningless comment 
24. See Boarn, supra not.e 20, at 57-73. 
25. For more on the two types of ironies see ALAN R. THOMPSON, AN ANATOMY 
OF DRAMA 36 (2d ed 1946). 
26. Quintilian first identified these types of irony; other critics and theorists have 
since elaborated on them. A recent useful discussion is DOUGLAS C. MUECKE, IRoNY 
(1970). But see ALAN R. THOMPSON, THE DR Y MOCK, A STUDY OF IRoNY IN DRAMA 
(1948); GARNETI' G. SEDGWICK, OF IRONY, EsPECIAILY IN DRAMA (2d ed 1948); ROB­
ERT BoIES SHARPE, IRONY IN THE COURTROOM DRAMA (1959). 
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lip service to an ideal that we begin to suspect the legal system 
may never have pursued. 
Note also that as a prosecutor Rusty can never presume an 
accused innocent, because to do so would violate the canons of 
legal ethics applicable to prosecutors.27 Once accused, he must 
confront his own beliefs, since he intends to take advantage of 
the requirement that the jury presume him innocent. Therefore, 
once the observer understands the film's message, the title be­
comes a kind of shorthand for the bewildering maze of legal 
procedures, media innuendo, and personal torment that an 
accusation of criminal behavior represents. The observer must 
understand (though he need not share) these assumptions, in 
order for the title to take on its nature as a straight-forward 
warning that the story has more than one meaning. The film is 
a crash course on the legal system. From its ironic title to its 
ironic conclusion it symbolizes both what is wrong and what is 
right about the U.S. legal system. 
Irony of Character 
To what evidence can we point to say that the film intends 
an ironic message? Let us consider first the irony of character, 
revealed by several of Booth's clues, that places a prosecutor, 
the traditional upholder of the law, on trial for his life.28 
27. See MODEL RULF.S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1994) ("The prosecutor 
in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause . . . . "). MODEL CoDE OF PROF&'!SIONAL 
REsPONSIBllJTY, EC 7-13 (1983). ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs 
from that of the usual advocate; his duty is t.o seek justice, not merely to con­
vict.") Under DR 7-103 "(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall 
not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is 
obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause." Id. 
28. Rusty's opening speech (a voice-over) in the film presents the dilemma of 
the story in microcosm. Like WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (Theme/United Artists 
1957), it begins and ends with a shot of an empty courtroom. Rusty explains the 
jury's role, which is to find the truth, t.o convict the guilty and to exonerate the 
innocent. The jury's role in fact is to interpret the evidence which the judge allows 
it to hear and to judge its persuasiveness, which may or may not have anything to 
do with truth. The jwy never has the opportunity to deliberate, since Judge Lyttle 
uses the question of missing evidence to dismiss the charges, based on his fear 
that the defense attorney will reveal unsavory facts about Lyttle's relationship with 
the deceased What we are to t.ake as true is revealed only in retrospect by Rusty. 
In the official version, no one is ever charged with the crime again. "It is a practi­
cal impossibility to try two people for the same crime." The prosector, whose job 
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Irony of character finds it.s expression bo
_
th in the iden�ty 
of the defendant, a prosecuting attorney, and m the conclusion 
of the film. The prosecuting attorney is effectively silenced, not 
only by the loss of his job (also a dramatic irony), ei�er 
through the lost election or through the aftermath of the trial, 
and by his knowledge of the identity of the real killer, who has 
ended his career by removing his ability to act "innocently," 
that is, by believing in the system. By losing his identity as 
suspect, he also loses his identity as prosecutor and as uphold­
er of justice. Rusty Sabich metamorphoses from one role to 
another so frighteningly, and so quickly, both in our minds and 
in the minds of his friends and associates, that we b egin to 
understand how tenuous and incidental freedom is for anyone 
not caught by the legal system, and how easy are capture, ar­
rest, trial, and possible conviction.29 Indeed, Rusty's arrest is 
an obvious example of the "straightforward warning" that irony 
is present. In the traditional legal or mystery thriller, the nar­
rator cannot be the killer, since as observers we need to be 
able t.o believe that the narrator is, if not one step ahead of the 
killer, at least able to determine the killer's identity.30 
In Presumed Inrwcent, even though some of Rusty's behav­
ior seems unusual and possibly incriminating (in particular, his 
request to Detective Lipranzer that the police not examine his 
telephone records), we proceed on the assumption that Rusty is 
it is to pursue the criminal and who was himself pursued, senses that the entire 
system, and his own life, has been derailed by the murder. Compare with the Ar­
gentinean film THE OmCIAL VERSION (Progress Communications 1985), in which the 
protagonist is forced to consider the true fat.e of her adopted child's natural family. 
29. The film asserts, and by the end, we believe, that the legal system is corrupt 
and unredeemable. All that stands between anyone caught in it and ultimate diSM­
ter are faithful friends and clever (hired) lawyers. As Alan Dershowitz tells his stu­
dent Maggie in REVERSAL OF FORTUNE (Sovereign Pictures 1990), once the accusa­
tion is made, "[y)ou have no one who believes in you. Even the mailman starts 
looking at you funny. All you've got is your lawyer." 
30. There are of course exceptions, the most notable being Agatha Christie's THE 
MURDER OF ROGER ACKROYD (1954), which caused a great furor when it was pub­
lished. Christie's revelation that the narrator was the killer was called "unfair" by 
� critics and resulted in a "prohibition" on this t.actic by the Detective Club. It 
IS listed as one of the Ten Commandments of Detection Ronald Knox A Det.ective 
Story Deca/,ogue, in Tm: ARr OF THE MYSTERY 8ToRY1 14 (Howard 
'
Haycraft ed. 
1946). A more modem Kmystery" novel which makes use of the narrator as perpe­
trator angle is Ernesto Sabat.o's EL TuNEL (1951). 
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beyond suspicion. His arrest triggers our belief that Rusty may 
indeed be guilty, even though at that point we have no idea 
what "story" could be presented to persuade us of that fact 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Our reaction immediately raises the 
specter of bias, both on the part of a justice system that, but 
for the independent act of a rival prosecutor, might have cov­
ered up his crime, and on the part of society (ourselves), which 
immediately equates arrest with guilt. Through an exploration 
of Rusty's dual roles as prosecutor and accused, the irony of 
impersonation forces us to re-examine our assumptions about 
"good" versus "bad," "right" versus "wrong," and "innocent" 
versus "guilty." The image of the upholder of the law as a po­
tential criminal sends us one of the film's most important ironic 
messages. 31 
The image of the lawyer, expert in the manipulation and 
control of the legal system, as the accused in a criminal trial 
(particularly murder), is an obvious choice for the author wish­
ing to present an ironic situation.32 We expect that lawyers can 
31. Note that immediately after Rusty's arrest, the film begins to emphasize to 
us that the evidence with which we are presented can tell one of two stories: guilt 
or innocence. The coroner's report seems to indicate that Rusty was very likely 
Carolyn's last sexual partner, but internal inconsistencies and the presence of the 
prosecutor's phone number written on the file indicate at best sloppy procedure 
which brings the probative value of the report into question and at worst an out­
right attempt to frame Rusty for the crime. In particular, the coroner's apparent in­
competence and inability to create a story to accord with the facts enforces our 
impression that he is part of a conspiracy against Rusty. He suggests that Carolyn 
had voluntary intercourse with the killer, someone she lmew. To explain the 
presence of the spermicide he suggests that the killer took the diaphragm away 
with him, since it wasn't in the body or in the apartment, but is at a loss to ex­
plain why he would have done so. He misses completely the evidence that Carolyn 
had undergone a tubal ligation which becomes evidence of his incompetence under 
Sandy Stern's cross-examination, and realizes that his explanation of the presence 
of the spermicide is completely untenable. Yet he is correct in maintaining that 
spermicide existed. 
Carolyn's tubal ligation is another ironic circumstance. This woman who was 
so passionately interested in prosecuting child abusers apparently wanted no chil­
dren of her own. An obvious inference is that she perceived childrearing as an 
impediment to her career. One might speculate that she was prosecuting these 
cases merely to advance that career, but we have already been notified that these 
are "dead end" cases. In addition, we have her own comment to Horgan that if all 
the ambitious and capable lawyers take higher-profile assignments, ". . . you have 
the worst lawyers trying the hardest cases." Note, however, that in the novel Caro­
lyn has had a child 
32. The use of the lawyer as defendant is a common and powerful ironic device 
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solve their problems easily through the "technicalities" with 
which they are familiar in order to avoid committing crimes. If 
they are accused of wrongdoing, the tendency of nonlawyers is 
to assume guilt according to one of the following theories: ( 1) 
they were not quite as expert as we assumed and were caught 
by attorneys (or other investigators) smarter than they (implica­
tion: some lawyers are honest); (2) they were expert but overly 
greedy, sloppy or desperate, and were caught by honest parties 
(implication: some lawyers are honest and the system itself is 
trustworthy, though subject to abuse); or (3) they were unbal­
anced personalities who happened to be attorneys (implication: 
the majority of lawyers are honest and the system will ferret 
them out). Depending upon the author's view of the legal sys­
tem and human nature his critique of the legal system-and 
consequently his final message to the observer-illustrates one 
of these theories. Rarely does the observer begin with the as­
sumption that the lawyer is guilty. The implied betrayal of trust 
demonstrated by an attorney's abuse of the system, a trust 
which always seems to recur, is so profound (in cases of em­
bezzlement or blackmail for example) that the observer prefers 
to believe the worst in order not to seem naive. In the case of 
murder the betrayal is even more basic, since of all crimes that 
the law is meant to prevent, murder is the most heinous. The 
taking of human life is the one irreparable harm and the one 
act that the law must avert by offering other, less violent op­
tions. 
Rusty's voice-over in the opening scene establishes the 
irony of his situation: "I am a part of the process of accusing, 
judging, and punishing." Normally, he can only do the first; as 
the defendant, first accused, then exonerated, he ends by doing 
the second because the first is denied to him. As we will dis­
cover, the identity of the real killer effectively precludes him 
from doing the third, just as the jury will never decide on 
in courtroom drama The television drama Indict and Convict (television movie 
1?74) features a prosecutor charged with the murder of his wife and prosecuted by 
his fonner colleagues. 'Throughout the drama, his innocence seems clearer than his 
guilt. � knowledge of the legal syst.em and of his colleagues, thought patterns en­
ables him to manipulate the system successfully for a time, although the prosecutor 
does manage a conviction. The result is more satisfying for the observer in terms 
of restoring his belief in the legal system, but it lacks philosophical interest. 
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"truth." Without that decision, no resolution is possible. Rusty's 
experience demonstrates that the very system to which he has 
devoted his life cannot uncover the truth necessary to resolve 
the question of guilt. Others (Rusty's lawyer, his police officer 
friend, the real killer, and the district attorney) intervene to 
prevent crucial evidence from being presented to that jury. 
What does his ordeal teach Rusty? That the system works 
only for those lmow who how to manipulate it. The presump­
tion of innocence isn't merely untrue; it's irrelevant. The fact 
that the jury---our designated representatives and the only out­
siders in the system-never gets the opportunity to pass judg­
ment on the accused tends to solidify that impression. To ren­
der judgment juries rely on stories that seem plausible, stories 
told to th.em by the lawyers and the witnesses involved-people 
whom the legal system tells us have some special ability to 
bring "relevant" (that is, procedurally acceptable) evidence into 
court. A jury must decide only on the behavior of witnesses 
and the accused that seems consistent with what it thinks it 
lrnows about how guilty and innocent people act in stressful 
situations. As potential jurors in real life, and as jurors in 
Rusty's cause, and in the cause of the legal system, we assume 
that the evidence truthfully delivered to us, as the fictional jury 
assumes it is delivered to them, is both is complete and proba­
tive. Presumed Inrwcent shows us that what we assume and 
"know" about the legal system may lead us into error. Knowl­
edge is often only presumption, and presumption may be preju­
dice. How the film reveals these presumptions and convinces 
us to adopt its "truths" instead of ours is due to the heavy use 
of irony in the telling of Rusty's story. As the film presents the 
"evidence" of the partiality and venality of the legal system, and 
of the impossibility of justice, we discover that our assumptions 
about justice are wrong. Ours is the third trial: we are on trial 
for our assumptions, for what we "know" about the legal sys­
tem. At the beginning we are innocent because we are ignorant. 
Having been presented with the evidence, we can no longer 
remain ignorn.nt or innocent Yet we are not totally innocent, 
since we secretly accept at least the possibility of Rusty's guilt, 
based only on his arrest, and not on any evidence presented in 
a court of law. We are already guilty of bias-precisely the 
film's point. 
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The irony of character that presents the lawyer-manipula­
tor as accused-manipulated also interacts directly with the 
contrast between speech and silence to make other points 
about the legal system. Rusty is a trained attorney with definite 
opinions about how to obtain a conviction, but seems to forget 
everything he knows about the likely reactions of jury and 
prosecutor when he himself is on trial. The Fifth Amendment 
preserves our right to be free from self-incrimination, and not 
to testify, and no guilt should be presumed from a refusal. 
Rusty knows that, yet has used it as a prosecutor when he can 
to get a conviction. As a defendant, he is trapped by the think­
ing he has helped to perpetuate. He argues with Sandy Stern, 
his attorney, over whether to t.estify. Rusty insists, "The jwy 
wants to hear me say I didn't do it." Defense attorneys in gener­
al prefer not to let their clients testify. The client may say 
something in an unguarded moment that the attorney cannot 
control, allowing the prosecutor an open opportunity to attack 
the defense's entire case. Whether Stern believes in Rusty's 
innocence or not is inunaterial, since as an experienced defense 
attorney, he has a different assessment of a defendant's si­
lence.33 He convinces Rusty to take the Fifth Amendment be­
fore the grand jury, although, like Claus von Bulow in Reversal 
of Fortune, Rusty takes the traditional stand of the innocent de­
fendant, that he has nothing to fear and that taking the Fifth 
only makes him appear guilty. 34 
Throughout the film the tension between the two attorneys 
contributes to the feeling of unease and uncertainty about the 
purpose of the proceedings. Rusty is concerned with his own 
33. Stern is clearly reacting to a fear that Rusty may be guilty, and may lie on 
the stand Defendants who talce the stand face prosecutors anxious to catch them 
in a lie, an almost sure route to conviction. Telephone interview with Kevin 
McMunigal, Feb. 16, 1995. 
34. This view is shared by many nonlawyers who equate "taking the Fifth" or 
arrest with guilt, expressed in remarks such as "If he didn't do it, why did they 
arrest. him?" or "If she won't testify, she must have something to hide." In spite of 
the� professed cynicism, many nonlawyers believe that the system works, that the 
police do not arrest without probable cause and that the innocent are acquitted 
Procedural guarantees such as the right against self-incrimination seem to them to 
be lawyer-tricks designed only to aid the guilty. Scott Turow's triumphantly ironic 
novel explores this attitude through its treatment of Sabich's feelings of isolation 
once he is indicted 
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exoneration, sensing that anything less than complete certainty 
as to his innocence will be fatal to his career and personal life. 
Stem simply wants an acquittal, and will use any means to get 
it, even procedural "tricks," which protect all defendants equal­
ly. However, silence often represents lies, while lies, freely and 
confidently told, masquerade as truth. Stern opposes Rusty's 
desire to testify, based on the cost/benefit analysis that all crim­
inal defense attorneys engage in: (1) how good is the evidence 
against Rusty? and (2) how good a witness will Rusty be? Stem 
fears that Rusty will be an ineffective witness, either because of 
his anger or because of his disbelief at his situation. While 
Stem prefers that Rusty not testify, he floats the possibility of 
Barbara's appearance on the stand. He believes that Barbara 
will be a good witness: a faithful wife believably testifying that 
her husband is innocent. His misconception makes him ironical­
ly correct about the likely effect of her testimony. Rusty's opin­
ion is completely opposite: not only does he believe that he can 
control his situation more completely if he testifies, he also 
believes (rightly) that Barbara will not be a convincing witness. 
He thinks her too emotionally unbalanced to present a coherent 
story. Ironically, her story would exonerate him, should she 
choose to tell it. 35 
By juxtaposing Rusty's role as prosecutor with his role as 
defendant, the film shows us the elaborate legal fictions behind 
our justice system. Presumed Innocent's fiction lays out the 
facts about the legal system. While the accused's silence is a 
right guaranteed by the Constitution, we secretly believe that 
only the guilty refuse to speak (hence Rusty's statement to 
Sandy: "The jury wants to hear m e  say I didn't do it.") Not only 
does the grand jury want to hear him say it, we want to hear it 
too, since we as the audience are the final arbitrars of Rusty's 
guilt or innocence. Although Stern tells the judge that Rusty is 
"an integral part of our defense," Rusty loses every tactical 
argument that he has with Stern. Like a good attorney, Stem 
35. The question of belief is a crucial one in many courtroom dramas, most 
notably in WITNESS FOR THE PRoSECUTION (Theme/United Artists 1957) in which the 
testimony of the prosecutor's main witness presents a sufficiently believable story 
to obtain the acquittal of a guilty defendant. For a more exhaustive discussion of 
this aspect of the courtroom drama, see Coreas, supra note t. 
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controls the defense completely. Sabich, the wily prosecutor, 
becomes Sabich the client, unable to make effective decisions 
in his own defense. 36 
The identities of the victim, police officers, witnesses, judg­
es, prosecuting and defense attorneys, and the killer also pres­
ent ironies of impersonation. Everyone in the film is guilty of 
either legal or moral wrongdoing. The dead woman, Carolyn 
Polhemus, is also a prosecuting attorney who is "put on trial" 
by certain of the defendant's friends, including the police detec­
tive, and found to be "bad news," that is, guilty. Indeed, her 
character is part of the justification used by Rusty's friend, the 
police officer Lipranzer, to withhold the evidence that could 
convict him. After the judge dismisses the charges, Lipranzer 
gives Rusty the evidence, even though he is not entirely sure 
that Rusty is innocent For him actual guilt is irrelevant, since 
Carolyn's manipulative and ambitious nature made her "bad 
news" to anyone involved with her.37 Like nearly everyone 
else, Lipranzer does not presume Rusty innocent, and re-inter­
prets his own role in the administration of justice to assist 
Rusty, a man he considers may be legally guilty but, if so, is 
morally innocent. 
Rusty's superior, Raymond Horgan, assigns Rusty the mur­
der case because "you're the only guy I can trust." In reality, 
Rusty is "the only guy" likely to be loyal enough to cover up 
36. "The lawyer who defends himself has a fool for a client" 
37. Actual guilt is not irrelevant to Rusty, but he is unable to do anything effec­
tive with the truth he uncovers. For a believer in the system, this outcome is most 
bitter and most ironic. 
One conunentator points out how effectively the film persuades us of the 
appropriate position of women in society, thus manipulating us to the extent that 
we never question Rusty's (uncorroborated) evidence about the real killer's identity. 
"Rusty Sahich is the only person aside from Barbara herself who latows that she is 
the guilty party (if, indeed, he tw not fabricated her story) . . . .  " Amelia Jones, 
"She Was Bad News": Male Paranoia and the Contemporary New Woman, in 25126 
CAMERA OBSCURA 297, 314 (1984). However, this interpretation seems unnecessarily 
cynical, suggesting as it does that Rusty has a continuing motive in lying about his 
guilt It may be that he constructs an explanation of the crime that implicates Bar­
bara in our eyes. However, we have no independent evidence that this is so and 
the film gives us no reason t.o believe that Rusty would deliberately implicate his 
wife in our eyes (there is no "other woman" apart from the victim; divorce is com­
mon in our society, and Barbara now has a job, helping t.o address Rusty's fear 
that he might have to pay alimony, Rusty does not seem either paranoid or insane 
enough t.o concoct such a story, et.c.) 
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Horgan's involvement with the dead woman. Horgan equates 
"trust" with blind loyalty. The prosecutor who should be as­
signed the case is Horgan's political enemy, who becomes the 
prosecuting attorney in Sabich's case. Yet Horgan doesn't trust 
Rusty enough to tell him the truth about the dead woman or 
about their involvement with the judge. Further, Horgan lies on 
the stand in a final effort to cover up his own involvement and 
implicate Rusty.38 
Horgan's role is particularly interesting, in that he is both 
Rusty's direct accuser and indirect savior. We learn through 
Rusty's attorney that the judge, that symbol of impartiality, has 
retained his post only through prior manipulation of the system 
by Horgan, who "saved a great legal mind" for the bench. Thus 
Horgan, the accuser, becomes the indirect means of Rusty's 
acquittal (irony of fate). 
The judge himself also has a pre-existing relationship with 
the victim, through her persistence in investigating the "B" 
(Bribery) file given to her by Horgan during their affair. That 
investigation leads to the dismissal of the charges against her 
accused killer, since the person named in the "B" file is the 
judge handling the case. In order to prevent the defense 
attorney's pursuit of the information in the file, he dismisses 
the charges by using the missing glass as evidence of police 
misconduct. He had a personal relationship with the victim (as 
did Horgan and Rusty), and should probably have recused him­
self, 39 but his failure to do so is the means of Rusty's escape. 
In a sense, therefore, Lyttle, the recipient of Horgan's earlier 
sympathy and assistance, returns the favor by releasing the 
defendant against whom Horgan testifies. 
Nico Della Guardia, the new district attorney who prose­
cutes Rusty, is a political rival whose assistant is Rusty's former 
colleague and personal enemy Tommy Molto (who quit the 
38. When Horgan harangues his employees to "act like professionals" in pursuing 
the investigation he is really demanding an arrest to enhance his chances of win­
ning re-election. Once he loses at the polls and no longer controls the investigation 
he becomes concerned that he might become a suspect, hence his insistence that 
Sabich mishandled the case, an accusation ironically true of the prosecution's han­
dling of the case against Sabich. 
39. See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) ("A Judge Should Avoid 
Impropriety . . . . "). 
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office the day that Carolyn's murder was discovered). Molto 
wishes to play the roles of both witness and prosecutor, by 
using a statement Rusty made to him as an admission of guilt. 
The judge refuses to recognize this dual personality, telling 
Della Guardia that Molto can act as either witness or prosecu­
tor, but not both. Sandy Stem, Rusty's attorney, has a reputa­
tion as a sharp, slick and (in spite of his foreign accent) suc­
cessM defense attomey,40 the kind with whom Rusty is nor­
mally embattled in a courtroom. Our assumptions about 
Sandy's true nature41 lead us further into contemplation of 
Rusty's guilt or innocence. If he were innocent, he would not 
turn to Sandy Stern, since only a guilty person would hire such 
a spectacularly successM advocate. We have difficulty cred­
iting Sandy Stern's ability to make his career defending only the 
innocent, if we believe Rusty to have been "innocent" (honest) 
until now, since we tend not to presume his clients "innocent." 
Yet without skillful lawyers like Stern, innocent defendants, 
among whom Rusty might be numbered, have no hope. 
The duality in the identity of the murderer also heightens 
the ironic message. She is Rusty's wife Barbara, the witness 
40. I am indebt.ed t.o Professor Laura Tartakoff, of the Case West.em Reserve 
University Political Science Department, for pointing out that few, if any, admirable 
attorneys in films are foreigners. The attribution of an accent, like the attribution 
of religion (in particular, Judaism) or another minority group, such as women, in 
cinematic lawyers t.ends t.o send specific messages t.o the viewer. African-American 
and women lawyers t.end to suffer from images of inferiority, which bypass the 
necessity for viewers to consider them as individuals in the cont.ext of the film. On 
African American lawyers see Ric Sheffield, Constructing a Social History of Afri­
can American Lawyers Through Popular Oulture: Film, Television, and Lawyer 
CaJJwun, 17 J. LEGAL PRoF. 45 (1992). On women lawyers see Carole Shapiro, 
Women Lawyers In Celluloid: Why Hollywood Skirts the Truth, 25 U. TOI .. L. REV. 
955 (1994) and Ric Sheffield, On Film: A Social History of Women Lawyers in 
Popular Culture 1930 to 1990, 14 LoY. L.A ENT. L.J. 73 (1993), and my forthcom­
ing essay on the series Civil Wars and women attorneys on television in the col­
lection LAw AND THE SMALL ScREEN (Robert Jarvis & Paul Joseph eds., forthcoming 
1998). 
41. The defense attorney's aggressively "blind" role tends t.o confuse laypersons, 
particularly in films such as ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia 1959), in which Paul 
Biegler gives the defendant Lieutenant Manion "the famous lecture" concerning the 
story that Manion should t.ell in order to preserve Paul's ability t.o act in ignorance 
of his guilt or innocence; JAGGED EDGE (Columbia 1985), in which Teddi Barnes 
confuses her client by asking him for the truth but telling him never to lie to her; 
and ADAM'S RIB (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1949), in which Amanda Bonner coaches her 
client into a convincing story. 
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Sandy Stern wishes to put on the stand, who eventually con­
fesses her crime and tells him that she would have come for­
ward with the truth had she known that Rusty would be tried 
and nearly convicted. Since he was originally in charge of the 
murder investigation, she believed he would have discovered 
her guilt and protected her by labelling the investigation "mt­
solved." Thus, her dual identity allows her to manipulate both 
Rusty and the legal system successfully. Significantly, Barbara 
is a mathematician, and her actions are rationally planned to 
lead to her desired outcome. 42 The irony implicit in the true 
identity of the murderer contrasts with the asswnptions that 
the investigators make about his/her real identity. The killer is 
presumed to be male, partly because the crime seems to have 
heavy sexual overtones43 and partly because Carolyn's enemies 
seem to be predominantly male (that is, criminals she has pros­
ecuted), even though her behavior threatens other women more 
than men. The supposed perverse nature of the crime seems 
uniquely associated with males, rather than females, even 
though Carolyn herself certainly understood the dark side of 
human natures based on both her courtroom and personal ex­
periences. The motive is indeed sexual, but it is committed by a 
member of the sex that is "preswned innocent." 
In the end, Rusty does exactly as she believes he would, 
telling the viewer "I couldn't take my son's mother away from 
him," just as his friend the police detective was not able to turn 
over evidence likely to condemn Rusty in the eyes of the jury. 
Like Lipranzer, the friend who cannot bring himself to assist in 
Rusty's prosecution by volnntarily producing the evidence with­
out being asked for it, Rusty's multiple role as father and hus­
band prevents him from doing justice as a prosecutor or as a 
vengeful and exonerated defendant. 
In addition, the film has some interesting things to say 
about men and women in general. The women lawyers in the 
film are either clever but destructive sirens-"bad news" like 
42. Some commentators have objected to this premise, pointing out that the 
likelihood of Rusty's conviction is so high, absent the fortuitous circumstances that 
lead to dismissal of the charges, that Barbara's protestations that she would have 
come forward to prevent his conviction cannot be credited See Jones, supra note 
37. 
43. "He fucked her to death,n says Lipranzer. 
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Carolyn Polhemus, or they are capable and honest but gender­
neutral or "masculine," like Mac.44 Raymond Horgan is sur­
prised that Carolyn wants the rape and child abuse cases that 
come into the office, suggesting that these are "dead end" cas­
es; ambitious assistant prosecutors should lust after other, 
more high-profile opportunities. Carolyn's interest in this type 
of litiga tion shows Horgan that she "doesn't get it"; she doesn't 
understand how to succeed because she is burying herself in a 
kind of gender-based legal ghetto. Nothing coul d  be further 
from the truth. Carolyn knows how to use her sexuality to get 
ahead in what should be an asexual pursuit: the pursuit of jus­
tice. 46 It is Rusty, the hand-picked successor to Horgan, who 
"doesn't get it" Although he s aves the most prominent cases 
for himself and tells Carolyn that child abuse trials are tough to 
win, and unfortunately not worth the office's time, she manipu­
lates him into helping her. Her passion for the child victims of 
these cases rekindles his own lost love for the law, and her 
passion for success at any price puts her and one other person 
onto a destructive path. 46 
Nor does Rusty understand his wife's ambition: he neglects 
her, undervalues her ambitions for an education ("My wife, the 
almost Ph.D."), and fails to recognize how desperate and dan­
gerous she is. She is as much "bad news" as Carolyn, though 
for different reasons. 
Dramatic Irony 
In tandem with irony of character, dramatic irony allows 
an exploration of the nature of speech, the interpretation of 
evidence, and the impact of storytelling on the judicial out­
come. 47 The identity of the real murderer is ironic. Instead of a 
former lover or a convict with a grudge against the victim, it is 
44. See generally Jones, supra note 37. 
45. Why such a successful and smart lawyer should want to sleep her way to 
the top is a mystery. Ironically, she may believe that the legal system is so unfair 
that even a talented and well-prepared female prosecutor cannot expect to succeed 
on her own merits, but will always need a male mentor. 
46. The novel specifies that Carolyn has a child, whom she has abandoned to its 
father, an irony lost in the fihn. 
47. While the author is the ultimate creator of both kinds of irony, he may also 
allow his characters to create one or both . in the interests of plot development 
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a woman, the defendant's wife, who frames him so effectively 
that, but for the skill of his lawyer and the chance suppression 
of crucial evidence that the killer herself had manufactured, he 
would have been convicted. The dramatic irony in Presumed 
Innocent furthers the film's message about presumptions of 
guilt and innocence in juxtaposing actions which are intended 
to have one effect but achieve quite another. Among Booth's 
clues to the presence of irony, conflicts of fact and conflicts of 
belief often combine to produce the dramatic irony. 
On the surface, the film is about a perfect murder: the 
death by violence of a beautiful and ambitious assistant district 
attorney, Carolyn Polhemus, and the arrest and trial of her 
former lover, another D.A., Rusty Sabich. To the prosecutors in 
the case, he looks very guilty. Evidence of his presence is all 
over the crime scene, he has no alibi, he has a motive (jealou­
sy), and no other suspects present themselves. It seems that 
Rusty has gone too far this time, and in his overconfidence, has 
assumed that he understood the system well enough to avoid 
capture. We read about these kinds of murders every day, and 
secretly believe in the accused's guilt, even though we know he 
should be "presumed innocent." After all, if he weren't guilty, 
the police wouldn't have arrested him, would they? We see the 
mobs of newspaper people covering the story, threatening 
Rusty's right to a fair and unbiased jury with their unending 
pre-trial publicity. We see the victims of this unfortunate situa­
tion: the faithful wife, the innocent son sent away to camp to 
escape the unwelcome attention, and the faithful friend unable 
to assist Rusty publicly. 
Rusty's attorney, Sandy Stern, goes into action. We see all 
the "tricks" of which Rusty as a prosecutor normally complains 
being used in his defense as Sandy looks for ways to discredit 
the evidence. We see Rusty's friend, a police detective, bend 
the rules to help him. If we read the stark details of this kind of 
activity in the paper, coupled with the news that the charges 
are eventually dismissed, we would be even more cynical, 
pointing out that as usual, the system protects its own: yet 
another guilty person with connections has "gotten off." Worse 
yet, he "gets off" on a "technicality"-the most crucial evidence 
against Rusty has "disappeared," proving to us that someone 
has tampered with evidence to help a guilty man go free. 
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Yet, this case is quite different; we know Rusty Sabich. 
From the beginning of the film, we have heard his calm voice 
describing the workings of the legal system, telling us his ver­
sion of events. Bad as things look for him, we believe him, be­
cause we are expected to like him. He has told us his most 
intimate thoughts, he has trusted us, and we feel obligated to 
trust him in return.48 But how can we help him? How can any­
one help him? The evidence against this presumably innocent 
man seems overwhelming. Immediately we feel the anxiety, the 
uncertainty, and the doubt about the fairness of the legal sys­
tem that the film wants us to feel. We begin to understand the 
irony of the title: we presume Rusty innocent, but "others" 
don't 
As Rusty tells us his story, we begin to appreciate more of 
the dramatic irony in the film. Conflicts of fact and belief 
abound. Rusty's fingerprints are on the bar glass found in 
Carolyn's apartment after her death, and presumed to be part 
of a set which she owned. We also know that he could not 
have made them the night of the murder, although he might 
have made them at some other time. We must reconcile these 
two facts, just as the jwy may eventually be called upon to do. 
The full irony does not surface until the end of the fihn, when 
we learn that the glass was not Carolyn's, and Rusty's finger­
prints were put there by himself in his own home. The killer 
transferred the glass to Carolyn's apartment to implicate Rusty, 
allowing the glass as well as other (manufactured) evidence to 
tell a particular (untrue) story: that Rusty was there on the 
night of the murder. That he had been there on other nights is 
indisputable, but undemonstrable. Another example: the police 
detective tells Rusty that the semen found indicates that the 
man involved had type "O" blood and was sterile (since the 
sperm were dead). "Like my very own," comments Rusty. 
"Yeah, I thought of that," says the detective, "but you got a kid." 
The semen is indeed Rusty's, and the sperm are dead because 
the woman with whom he had intercourse (who was not Caro-
48. Compare with barrister Wilfred Robards' assessment of Leonard Vole and 
Christine Helm in WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION (Theme/United Artists 1957) 
("They [the jwy) don't like Christine Vole, but they believe her. They like Leonard 
but they don't believe him"). 
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lyn) used a spennicide, while Carolyn did not. 
The incoming district attorney removes Lipranzer from the 
case because prosecutors believe his friendship with the ac­
cused will entice him to misuse his position in the police de­
partment. The removal actually facilitates the detective's ability 
to help his friend, whom he begins to suspect of the crime. His 
explanation is that he took custody of the glass after it returned 
from the crime lab, by which time he was no longer on the 
case. No one ever asked him for the evidence, so he never 
volunteered it. The question of spoliation of evidence, while a 
minor point in the drama, nevertheless emphasizes the theme: 
"taking the law into one's own hands" to obtain justice. Thus, 
the prosecutor's act results in the destruction of his case 
against Rusty. Turow's point is particularly ironic in that it is a 
police detective who "takes the law into his own hands" and a 
public prosecutor (an experienced officer of the court unable to 
help himself even though he nnderstands the system complete­
ly) who benefits from the act. We, as observers, concur in the 
detective's decision. That the defendant is innocent is both a 
validation of the act and ultimately irrelevant, and even more 
ironic, since Turow's clear message through the juxtaposition 
of title ("Presumed Inrwcent") with process ("presumed guilty," 
even by one's friends, who know the flaws in the system, just 
as Christine Vole, the "witness" in Witness for the Prosecution, 
knows the flaws in the system) and ultimate outcome (dismiss­
al of the charges without exoneration and public revelation of 
the guilty party) is that only the naive believe in the presump­
tion of innocence. The knowledgeable realize that to achieve 
justice one must circumvent the procedural safeguards in the 
system. 
IBtimately Rusty is revealed as naive. He has believed in 
the concept of the presumption of innocence. Until his personal 
entanglement in the system he believes in its fundamental fair­
ness, even though he knows some participants in it are dishon­
orable. By reversing his initial decision and agreeing to partici­
pate in the child abuse case Carolyn is prosecuting, he attempts 
to reaffinn that belief in spite of the fact that he doubts the 
jmy will believe the child, because his experience is that child 
witnesses recant their generally truthful testimony in these 
types of cases. He pleads the boy's cause eloquently. Consider 
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his closing statement to the jury in the child abuse case: He 
repeats the child's testimony simply and directly: "My mommy 
hurt my head . . .  my mommy hurl my head." While he intends 
to appeal to the emotionalism of the jury, he also clearly be­
lieves in the boy's veracity; Carolyn has convinced him through 
her own concern and naivete. 
Similarly, Raymond Horgan, Rusty's former boss, helped 
the presiding judge out of a moral and legal predicament sever­
al years before rather than reveal the judge's wrongdoing. In 
doing so, says Rusty's attorney, Horgan rescued a good man 
and restored a "good legal mind to the bench," but also helped 
provide the means through which the case will be dismissed. In 
a drama in which so many characters make their living from 
the law (which should represent the pursuit of justice) other 
emotions, not unexpectedly friendship, but also jealousy and 
revenge, interfere to tip the scales toward outcomes that are 
morally just, although not legally sanctioned. 
The "clashes of style" clue to irony is present in Tommy 
Molto's allegation that Rusty's sarcastic response, "Yeah, you're 
right" represents a confession of guilt. We are present when 
Rusty snaps back at Molto, and we know that the comment is 
not meant to be taken literally. That Molto attempts to do so, 
either because he is so malicious and desperate that he willing­
ly misinterprets the remark, or because he believes the judge to 
be so incompetent that he thinks the judge will do so, illus­
trates part of the fihn's message that the legal system is only as 
just as the individuals involved in it. The judge, however, recog­
nizes the remark as an ironic one: it does not correspond with 
his assumptions about how Rusty nonnally speaks to a col­
league, nor is it characteristic of the remarks of a knowledge­
able attorney who understands the charge being made. There­
fore it must have another meaning, which the judge correctly 
assigns to it. Note that Rusty does not interpret Tommy Molto's 
remark as ironic, however, because he believes the man is 
corrupt and may be intellectually lacking. He takes the remark 
literally to mean that Molto seriously believes he killed Carolyn. 
What he does not take literally is the possibility that he may 
actually be accused. 
The ironic contrast between the meanings of silence and 
speech in the film also illustrates the importance of storytelling. 
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This includes not only the film's telling of Rusty's story, but 
also the lawyers' telling of stories to the juries, and other 
characters' telling of their own stories. Silence as a means of 
storytelling is also ironic in Presumed Inrwcent. Various 
characters' silences represent both truth and lie. Rusty's si­
lence, both before the grand jury, and during the trial, tells 
those who believe that "there is no smoke without fire" that he 
is guilty. His police officer friend's silence further indicts him at 
the end, indicating that his friend remained silent about the 
glass because he believes Rusty is guilty. Raymond Horgan's 
initial silence about his prior relationship with Carolyn also 
tends to make Rusty look more guilty. Horgan's silence about 
Judge Lyttle's financial problems, as well as the judge's silence 
about his involvement with Carolyn, hide the motives of other 
characters for the crime. Judge Lyttle's silencing of Sandy Stem 
in regard to the "B" file shows his guilt and the use of silence 
to achieve the acquittal of an innocent man. 
Rusty is in danger of being convicted of the murder 
through the evidence planted by the real killer, and is only 
freed because his police detective fri end "is si­
lent"-withholding vital evidence, a glass with Rusty's finger­
prints on it. 
Rusty Sabich is unable to speak the truth at the end of 
Presumed Inrwcent, silenced as much as is Teddi Barnes in 
Jagged Edge.49 Both are officers of the court who know the 
identity of the killer but who can say nothing. Rusty's inability 
to speak comes from 1) his practical knowledge of the legal 
system and 2) his personal inability to sacrifice his son's 
happiness. Unlike Teddi Barnes he cannot even eliminate the 
killer in self-defense, though significantly he stands in a closer 
personal relationship to her than does Teddi to Jack Forrester. 
The case he knows the most about from both sides is the case 
he can never prosecute, and never bring to a conclusion. Sandy 
Stern pays little attention to Rusty's protestations of innocence, 
and manages to obtain a dismissal through clever manipulation 
of the judge, though the circumstantial evidence, as well the 
public sentiment, against his client is great. 
49. (Columbia Pictures 1985). 
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Some scenes in the film demonstrate the power of story­
telling to propel the legal system. When the overly ambitious 
prosecutor tries to introduce Rusty's sarcastic comment "Yeah, 
you're right," as a confession, the judge tells him what we 
would tell him if we were there; "You don't get it, Mr. Prosecu­
tor. He wasn't confessing, he was telling you where to go." The 
prosecutor tells one story to explain Rusty's remark. The judge 
creates another, which although he wasn't there, coincides 
more nearly with our experience. 
Nico Della Guardia also wants Tommy Molto to testify to 
Rusty's remark. While he does not cite the applicable rule, 
Judge Lyttle refuses to let Molto act as both witness and prose­
cutor, and forces Della Guardia to choose between putting the 
man on the stand as a witness to Rusty's dubious "confession" 
and keeping him as his associate.60 
To explain Rusty's frequent phone calls to Barbara from 
Carolyn's apartment, Sandy suggests that the timing coincides 
with the prosecution of an important case. It is to be expected 
that the two lawyers would be in frequent consultation. Howev­
er, when Rusty suggests this explanation to Lipranzer early in 
the film, the police officer is unconvinced, indicating both that 
he trusts his own evaluation of Carolyn enough to believe that 
she and Rusty were somehow involved personally, and that his 
loyalty to Rusty may eventually outweigh his duty as a member 
of the justice system. 
The opening scene of the film is another example of dra­
matic irony. While the empty courtroom implies the possibility 
of "truth," a lack of bias, and a presumption of innocence, the 
forum in which we will discover the reality behind the accusa­
tion against Rusty is not the courtroom at all. Indeed, the jury 
never has an opportunity to decide among the stories present­
ed, since the charges are dismissed. The courtroom becomes 
instead a stage-a metaphor51 through which different charac-
50. Judge Lyttle is clearly refening to Rule 3. 7 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFES­
SIONAL CONDUCT (1994), which do not allow an attorney to appear as a witness in 
a proceeding in which he also acts as an advocate, except in certain very limited 
circwnstances. 
51. The courtroom as st.age or theater is a common one, both in writing about 
trial practice and literature and in film. See for example the opening scene of 
ADAM'S Rm (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1949) in which the opening credits appear super-
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ters tell contradictory stories about Rusty's guilt, in which the 
prize goes to the story which seems to explain the admissible 
evidence most satisfactorily, and in which reality and truth 
become secondary considerations. 
Conflicts of Belief, Conflicts of Fact, and the Film's Message 
In microcosm, the child abuse case that Carolyn prose­
cutes represents the · kinds of conflicts that predominate Pre­
sumed Innocent. As Rusty points out, the difficulty that Carolyn 
Polhemus has in persuading the child witness in the abuse case 
to stick to his story is a major problem in prosecuting such 
cases. Child victims often recant their testimony when faced 
with their tormentors in open court. Thus, they may tell the 
opposite of the truth and jurors may consequently (and 
ironically) believe them, partly through a failure to understand 
their difficulty and fear, and partly through an unwillingness to 
accept the enormity of the crime. The presumption of inno­
cence will then lead to the acquittal of the guilty rather than 
the protection of the innocent. 
The major example of conflicts of belief present in Pre­
sumed Inrwcent is Rusty's faith in the legal system, developed 
through his own sense of honor and his work as a prosecutor. 
When that legal system wtjustly accuses him of murder, he 
must reconcile his previous opinion of the system with its pres­
ent workings, and he must attribute what he considers its aber­
ration in putting him on trial to something other than a funda­
mental flaw in the system. Otherwise, he will not be able to 
continue as a lawyer after his acquittal. The exploration of 
Rusty's frustration with the rules of the system exemplifies the 
film's message. Throughout the movie, he has had trouble un­
derstanding the true nature of the legal system. He has pre­
sumed it innocent, believed in its promise. In spite of the skill 
demonstrated by several characters in the film in manipulating 
Rusty's acquittal, Presumed Innocent is also about understand­
ing what's going on and how to survive. It is about luck, both 
bad and good. It is about one man's passion for the law, 
another's passion for a woman, and about a woman's passion 
imposed on a t.oy theater. 
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for her distant husband. It is about what goes on under the 
surface, and about the truths that we believe, though they re­
main unspoken. It is about friendship. It is about the lies we 
need to make our society work. It is about trust, and the lack 
of it. Except in the most superficial way, it is not about inno­
cence. 
Nearly every one in Presumed Innocent is guilty of some­
thing that is morally or legally wrong, although only a few are 
punished. Rusty loses his wife, his career, his reputation and 
his faith. His wife loses the man she loves. The murder victim 
is never avenged. Tommy Molto, Nico Della Guardia, and the 
coroner all enhance their reputations for incompetence. 52 Pre­
sumed Innocent is about a legal system that goes wrong and 
only achieves the right result because two very smart people 
who understand that system are willing to manipulate it. 
When Rusty Sabich finally discovers the truth it is again 
ironically through a conversation which has a figurative mean­
ing different from its literal meaning. As he discovers the blood­
stained tool that is the murder weapon, his wife comes in an­
nouncing "I did it!" She is referring to the job interview in 
which she has effectively convinced a prospective employer 
that she is qualified for the position, but also in a larger sense 
to the life she leads: she has convinced everyone that she is a 
normal, loving, understanding and patient wife. However, Rusty 
initially (and correctly) takes her statement as confirmation 
that she is Carolyn's killer. As she continues her discussion of 
the interview, we understand what her remark means in that 
context, and initially condemn Rusty for his evil thoughts; we 
"preswne" her "innocent." Eventually, however, we understand 
that his initial understanding was correct and the full force of 
the film's mes.sage becomes clear. 
Presumed Innocent forces us to confront our innermost 
fears about the legal system, namely that someone entirely 
innocent can be accused, "framed," and sentenced for some­
thing he hasn't done. Presumed Innocent also shows us that if 
we believe in the preswnption of innocence, we don't "get it." It 
52. Raymond Horgan, however, goes on to a new job in a prestigious law finn, 
the judge carries on with his career and Sandy Stem enhances his reputation with 
yet another successful defense. 
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leads us through the darkness of our own cynicism about the 
legal system and the possibility of justice. But if we don't ac­
cept the presumption of innocence, we are as flawed and as 
guilty as the system. 
Presumed Innocent also forces us to take on certain roles 
in the drama of the legal system, just as Rusty does. We are not 
just observers of the drama, we are the judges evaluating the 
testimony we hear and the actions we see (note that we never 
see a scene in which Rusty does not appear or of which he 
does not have personal knowledge). In this way, Rusty controls 
our opinion of the legal system, even though we are unaware of 
it. Rusty the prosecutor also takes on other roles: he is the 
accused, and he is also, at the end of the film, judge and jury. 
He is betrayed by nearly everyone he trusts: his boss, his mis­
tress, and his wife. Only his lawyer and his police officer friend 
stand by him in an effective way. His is the nightmare we all 
dread. The film shows . us clearly that the only way to defeat 
this oppressive, megalithic, overwhelming legal system is with 
smart supporters who can manipulate the system, and not 
through innocence. Absent a clever defense attorney, the pre­
sumption of innocence is worth nothing. In a behemoth of a 
legal system, not even a smart prosecutor-turned-defendant can 
avoid conviction unless his defense lawyer is even smarter than 
he is. And what does this tell us about the other clients which 
that lawyer represents? Do they look as guilty as Rusty? Are 
they more guilty than he? And will Sandy Stern get them off, 
even if Rusty is the prosecutor in the case? What does this tell 
us about the legal system? That the only way to win is to ma­
nipulate the system? 
The film brings into question everything we want to believe 
about the legal system, including the idea that if we tell the 
truth, we will be believed and everything will be all right. 63 
Rusty wants to testify, but his lawyer resists this idea In 
Sandy's opinion, a client who testifies condemns himself. Then 
can we believe that Rusty is a good lawyer, an effective prose­
cutor? Has he inadvertently condemned innocent defendants? 
53. Compare with some of the film noir movies that Norman Rosenberg exam­
ines, supm note 10. 
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Ultimately everything the film tells us is encapsulated in 
the title: Presumed Innocent. Those two words have contradic­
tory meanings to the non-lawyer. They seem to be a shield 
against unfair condemnation. But given our belief that every­
body has something to hide, they also mean that the accused is 
guilty, we just haven't proven it yet. That is certainly the mean­
ing thrust on the poor, ignorant, or unpopular defendant. 
Presumed Inrwcent's dark vision of the legal system tells 
us that anyone can be accused. The legal system doesn't con­
demn Rusty, but it doesn't exonerate him either. His lawyer and 
his friend help derail the system to save him from conviction. 
They cannot save him from the whispers of his neighbors. Nor 
can anyone else, because we know that the real killer will nev­
er stand trial. We know, because Rusty tells us so. He has been 
a prosecutor, he knows how these things work. Why at this 
point would he lie to us? We hope that in the future, we will try 
to presume others innocent, but we also understand ourselves 
and our tendency to believe "there's no smoke without fire." 
Presumed Inrwcent thus represents the triumph of proce­
dure over substance that makes non-lawyers cynical. We lmow 
that no "public truth" about the murder of Carolyn Polhemus 
will ever emerge. We also know the private truth about her 
death, and about the death of our trust in the legal system. We 
now know we must always presume innocence, but we also 
know that, having suffered through a trial with Rusty Sabich, 
we can never be innocent again. 
